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INTRODUCTION 
The ability to protect a design with trade dress that either is also protected 
by a design patent or was previously protected by a now expired design patent 
unconstitutionally extends the protection of new, original, and ornamental 
designs.  Even further, the ability to receive indefinite trade dress protection for 
an unpatented, but patentable, design unconstitutionally allows indefinite 
protection of patentable subject matter.  The right to copy an invention claimed 
by an expired utility or design patent stems from the language and intent of the 
Intellectual Property (“IP”) Clause, and there is substantial Supreme Court and 
other precedent that supports the right to copy doctrine.  For the past forty years, 
however, the right to copy doctrine has all but disappeared from the Supreme 
Court’s language.  In fact, the Federal Circuit has explicitly abandoned the right 
to copy doctrine.1  Instead, in the TrafFix decision, the Supreme Court has 
resorted to the functionality doctrine to prevent the term extension of a utility 
patent through trade dress protection.2  The lower courts, before and after 
TrafFix, have made the same determination that the functionality doctrine 
prevents any conflict between trade dress and patent protection.3 
The functionality doctrine, however, does not address the conflict between 
design patent and trade dress protection.  In fact, the functionality doctrine has 
inflated the problem since TrafFix.  TrafFix stands for the proposition that a 
utility patent is presumptive evidence of functionality for a trade dress 
analysis.4  Courts have since interpreted this to mean the converse for a design 
patent; namely, that a design patent is presumptive, but not dispositive, 
evidence of non-functionality for a trade dress analysis.5  This is because a 
design patent would also be invalid if the design was functional and not 
ornamental.6  Therefore, it is more likely that a design will receive trade dress 
protection if that same design is or has been the subject of a design patent. 
This Comment will argue that the ability to receive trade dress protection 
on a design that has been or could be the subject of a design patent is 
unconstitutional.  The first section of this Comment will discuss the overlap 
 
1. Midwest Indus., Inc. v. Karavan Trailers, Inc., 175 F.3d 1356, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 1999); see 
generally In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 372 F.3d 539, 543 n.2 (C.C.P.A. 1967) (Smith, J., 
concurring). 
2. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 29–30 (2001). 
3. See e.g. Epic Metals Corp. v. Souliere, 99 F.3d 1034 (11th Cir. 1996); W.T. Rogers Co., Inc. 
v. Keene, 778 F.2d 334, 337 (7th Cir. 1985). 
4. TrafFix, 532 U.S. at 29–30. 
5. See e.g. Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Bay Int’l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 683–684 (6th Cir. 2006); 
Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Constr. Mach. Co., Ltd., 668 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir. 2012); In re Becton, 
Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012).  
6. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006); Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
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between design patent and trade dress protection and how it leads to products 
receiving protection in both areas.  The second section will discuss the right to 
copy doctrine, its root in the Constitution, and its development through 
Supreme Court and Federal Circuit precedent.  The third section will discuss 
the TrafFix decision and the role it has played in preventing the extension of 
utility patent terms, but bolstered the extension of design patent terms, through 
trade dress protection.  The fourth section will argue that this unconstitutionally 
allows for indefinite protection of designs covered by expired or unexpired 
design patents and products that are unpatented but patentable under design 
patents.  Finally, this Comment will argue that the only solution is to not allow 
trade dress protection for designs that are patentable as design patents.  Some 
argue that merely forcing a choice between trade dress and design patent 
protection is sufficient;7 however, if the subject matter of design patents is 
properly within the scope of patent protection, then allowing such designs to 
bypass the constitutional limitations of patent protection by calling them trade 
dress is still an unconstitutional term for a monopoly on a design. 
I.  THE OVERLAP BETWEEN DESIGN PATENT AND TRADE DRESS 
Design patent and trade dress protections have significant overlap.  While 
not identical, the subject matter and tests for validity and infringement are very 
similar.  Product configurations often qualify for both or either types of 
protection, and claims for both are often asserted in the same litigation.  
However, the overlap is such that the subject matter of expired design patents 
can be indefinitely protected under trade dress.  This Comment will argue that 
this unconstitutionally extends the protection for new, original, and ornamental 
designs beyond a limited time and unconstitutional inhibits the right to copy. 
A.  Design Patent Protection 
Design patents protect the “new, original and ornamental design for an 
article of manufacture.”8  An ornamental design can be surface ornamentation 
on an article of manufacture, the configuration of an article of manufacture, or 
a combination of both.9  An article of manufacture, unlike the subject of 
copyright protection, must necessarily serve a utilitarian purpose.10  Both 
 
7. Takashi Saito, Dressing Design Patent: A Proposal for Amending the Design Patent Law in 
Light of Trade Dress, 89 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 682, 688 (2007); Perry J. Saidman, Kan 
TrafFix Kops Katch the Karavan Kopy Kats?, 82 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 839, 888–889 
(2000). 
8. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006). 
9. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 525 (1871); In re Blum, 374 F.2d 904, 907 n.1 
(C.C.P.A. 1967). 
10. L.A. Gear, Inc. v. Thom McAn Shoe Co., 988 F. 2d 1117, 1123 (Fed. Cir. 1993). 
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design and utility patents may be obtained on an article “if invention resides 
both in its utility and ornamental appearance.”11  However, like trade dress, 
articles of manufacture that are functional cannot receive design patent 
protection. 
An article of manufacture is functional, according to design patent parlance, 
if it is dictated by the use or purpose of the article.12  To determine whether a 
design is dictated by its use, the Court must ask whether the claimed design is 
“the only possible form of the article that could perform its function.”13  If 
“there are several ways to achieve the function of an article of manufacture, the 
design of the article is more likely to serve a primarily ornamental purpose.”14  
Put another way, “if other designs could produce the same or similar functional 
capabilities, the design of the article in question is likely ornamental, not 
functional.”15  Although certain features of an article of manufacture can be 
functional, 
a distinction exists between the functionality of an article or features 
thereof and the functionality of the particular design of such article or 
features thereof that perform a function. Were that not true, it would not 
be possible to obtain a design patent on a utilitarian article of 
manufacture, . . . or to obtain both design and utility patents on the same 
article[.]16 
The Federal Circuit has similarly stated “that the design of a particular 
article is related to the article’s use may not defeat patentability.”17  The 
ultimate question is “whether functional considerations demand only this 
particular design or whether other designs could be used.”18 
The court in Richardson I went on to list the following additional 
considerations for analyzing whether a design is primarily ornamental: 
 
11. Manual of Patent Examining Procedures (“MPEP”), § 1502.01, “Distinction Between 
Design and Utility Patents [R-2]” (8th ed., Aug. 2011). 
12. Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F. 3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2002). 
13. Id. 
14. Id.; L.A. Gear, 988 F.2d at 1123 (citing Avia Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, 853 
F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988)); Richardson v. Stanley Works, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 2d 1046, 1049 (D. 
Ariz. 2009) (“Richardson I”), aff’d 597 F.3d 1288, 1298 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“Richardson II”). 
15. Rosco, 304 F.3d at 1378. 
16. Avia, 853 F.2d at 1563 (citing Pacific Furniture Mfg. Co. v. Preview Furniture Corp., 800 
F.2d 1111 (Fed. Cir. 1986) (design patent for chairs)); Carman Indus., Inc. v. Wahl, 724 F.2d 932, 
938–39 (Fed. Cir. 1983); In re Dubois & Will, 262 F.2d 88, 90 (Fed. Cir. 1958). 
17. Hupp v. Siroflex of Am., Inc., 122 F.3d 1456, 1460 (Fed. Cir. 1997). 
18. Id. 
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(1) whether the protected design represents the best design; 
(2) whether alternative designs would adversely affect the utility of the 
specified article; 
(3) whether there are any concomitant utility patents; 
(4) whether the advertising touts particular features of the design as 
having specific utility; and 
(5) whether there are any elements in the design or an overall 
appearance clearly not dictated by function.19 
The test for infringement of a design patent is the ordinary observer test.  
The Supreme Court declared the test as follows: 
if, in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a 
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the 
resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to 
purchase one supposing it to be the other, the first one patented is 
infringed by the other.20 
B.  Trade Dress Protection 
Trade dress protects “the total image and overall appearance of a product 
or business as reflected in such features as size, shape, color or color 
combinations, design of a label, texture, graphics or sales techniques.”21  
Generally, trade dress protection includes the packaging or design of a 
product.22  To qualify for protection, the design of the product must be 
distinctive.23  The distinctiveness of a design for a product (trade dress) can be 
established “only upon a showing of secondary meaning.”24 
The doctrine of secondary meaning for trade dress asks whether the design 
of a product “has come through use to be uniquely associated with a specific 
source.”25  The Supreme Court stated that “[t]o establish secondary meaning, a 
manufacturer must show that, in the minds of the public, the primary 
significance of a product feature or term is to identify the source of the product 
rather than the product itself.”26  Secondary meaning has no counter-part in 
design patent law. 
 
19. Richardson I, 610 F. Supp. 2d at 1049–50. 
20. Gorham Mfg. Co. v. White, 81 U.S. 511, 528 (1871). 
21. Joel W. Reese, Defining the Elements of Trade Dress Infringement under Section 43(a) of 
the Lanham Act, 2 TEX. INTELL. PROP. L.J. 103, 104 (1993–94). 
22. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Bros., Inc., 529 U.S. 205, 209 (2000). 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (2006). 
24. Wal-Mart, 529 U.S. at 216. 
25. Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763, 766 n.4 (1992). 
26. Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982). 
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Like design patents, the design of a product is entitled to trade dress 
protection only if it is nonfunctional.27  Functionality in trade dress parlance, 
like in design patent parlance, has a specific meaning that does not necessarily 
comport with the ordinary, every-day meaning of the term.  Similar to design 
patent functionality, a design is not functional under trade dress law merely 
because it serves a function.28  Rather, unlike design patent law, the focus of 
trade dress functionality is competition, and a design is functional if “free 
competition would be unduly hindered by according the design trademark 
protection.”29  Put another way, a design is functional if “the feature is one that 
competitors would find necessary to incorporate into their product in order to 
be able to compete effectively.”30  According to the Supreme Court, the relevant 
inquiry is whether the design “is essential to the use or purpose of the article or 
if it affects the cost or quality of the article.”31  The Supreme Court expanded 
upon this meaning by observing that a functional feature is one the exclusive 
use of which would be competitors at a significant non-reputation-related 
disadvantage.32  While the functionality doctrines in trade dress and design 
patent law are substantially similar, the purpose of each is different and thus 
results in a slightly different doctrine; the primary purpose of trade dress 
functionality is competition,33 and the primary purpose of design patent 
functionality is to promote the decorative arts.34 
Furthermore, the doctrine of aesthetic functionality is one that exists in 
trade dress law and not design patent.  Because the functionality doctrine in 
trade dress focuses on competition, trade dress law has a doctrine of aesthetic 
functionality that denies trade dress protection for purely ornamental features 
that are essential to competition.35  Specifically, the court in Wallace held that 
“where an ornamental feature is claimed as a trademark and trademark 
protection would significantly hinder competition by limiting the range of 
adequate alternative designs, the aesthetic functionality doctrine denies such 
protection.”36 This doctrine creates the potential for a design that is functional 
under trade dress law but ornamental under design patent law. 
 
27. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775. 
28. Vaughan Mfg. Co. v. Brikam Int’l, Inc., 814 F.2d 346, 349 (7th Cir. 1987). 
29. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775. 
30. Vaughan, 814 F.2d at 349. 
31. Inwood, 456 U.S. at 850 n.10. 
32. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 32–33 (2001) (citing Qualitex 
Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 165 (1995)). 
33. Two Pesos, 505 U.S. at 775. 
34. Avia Grp. Int’l, Inc. v. L.A. Gear California, 853 F.2d 1557, 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1988). 
35. Wallace Int’l Silversmiths, Inc. v. Godinger Silver Art Co., Inc., 916 F.2d 76, 80–81 (2d 
Cir. 1990). 
36. Id. at 81. 
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Design patents and trade dress protect very similar subject matter.  Both 
protect the overall configuration of products, and both are limited by a similar 
functionality doctrine.  Often times, the manufacturer of a product will attempt 
to receive both types of protection on the same product, even if the courts 
inevitably strike down the overlapping protection.37  This Comment will argue 
that this type of sequential protection between design patent and trade dress 
destroys the right to copy doctrine that was once a critical doctrine in patent 
jurisprudence.  The right to copy is functionally destroyed by the ability to 
protect a design previously covered by a design patent through trade dress 
because the design previously covered by the design patent will potentially 
never enter the public domain.  The next section of this Comment will discuss 
the development of the right to copy doctrine and its relation to design patent 
and trade dress protection. 
II.  THE RIGHT TO COPY SAGA 
Two phrases in the Constitution create the right to copy.  Article I, Section 
8, Clause 8 of the Constitution, which is often referred to as the Copyright and 
Patent Clause,38 provides: 
[The Congress shall have the power] [t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and 
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries[.]39 
The two phrases from here that create the right to copy are “to promote the 
progress” and “for limited times.”  The right to copy promotes progress by 
allowing the public to build upon the inventions in expired patents and stimulate 
new innovation.40  It is self-evident why the right to copy follows from the 
constitutional mandate that patent rights be for limited times; if the right to copy 
 
37. See, e.g., Wilcox & Gibbs Sewing-Machine Co. v. The Gibbens Frame, 17 F. 623, 625 
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1883); Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 119–20 (1938); In re Mogen 
David Wine Corp., 372 F.3d 539, 542 (C.C.P.A. 1967); In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1345 
(C.C.P.A. 1974). 
38. See, e.g., Golan v. Holder, 132 S. Ct. 873, 878 (2012). 
39. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. (Scholars have pointed out that this is really two clauses in 
one: the Copyright Clause and the Patent Clause.  In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 958 (C.C.P.A. 1979).  
The Copyright Clause is to promote the Progress of Science, by securing for limited Times to Authors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings. Id.  The Patent Clause is to promote the Progress of 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective 
Discoveries.  Id.). 
40. Aronson v. Quick Point Pencil Co., 440 U.S. 257, 262 (1979); Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 480–81 (1974). 
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never actualized, the patent monopoly would not be limited in time.41 
A.  The Supreme Court Creates a New Hope for the Right to Copy 
Almost one hundred and twenty years ago, the Supreme Court declared that 
the expiration of a patent dedicates the subject of that patent to the public 
domain.42  Not only did the Supreme Court believe this to be true, it believed it 
to be “self evident.”43  This dedication to the public domain is a result of the 
bargain that the patent owner makes when applying for and receiving the 
benefits of the patent monopoly.44  Nearly forty years later, the Supreme Court 
again declared that the dedication to the public of the invention within an 
expired patent naturally follows from the expiration of the patent.45  But the 
Supreme Court did not stop there.  The Supreme Court went on to declare that, 
along with the dedication of the invention within the expired patent, an expired 
patent necessarily dedicates “the generic designation of the thing which has 
arisen during the monopoly” to the public.46  Secondary meaning was irrelevant 
because the only reason the owner of the expired patent had acquired secondary 
meaning was through the monopoly on the product it had from the patent.47 
For another fifty years, the Supreme Court used its precedent in Singer and 
Kellogg to reinforce the right to copy doctrine.48  While the Supreme Court used 
the Supremacy Clause in both of these cases to preempt state unfair competition 
laws that extended expired patent rights,49 the analysis of the right to copy 
doctrine is clear: when a patent expires, the monopoly created by it expires, and 
the right to make the article passes to the public.50 
B.  The CCPA Strikes Back at the Right to Copy 
A shift was put into motion with a Trademark Trial and Appeals Board 
(TTAB) decision that affirmed the refusal of the registration for trade dress 
 
41. Saidman, supra note 7, at 887; Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 231–32 
(1964); Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 146 (1989); Scott Paper Co. v. 
Marcalus Mfg. Co., 326 U.S. 249, 255 (1945); August Tech. Corp. v. Camtek, Ltd., 655 F.3d 1278, 
1288 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 480–81. 
42. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896). 
43. Id. 
44. Id. 
45. Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 118 (1938). 
46. Id. 
47. Id. at 118. 
48. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co., v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 229–30 (1964); Bonito Boats 
v. Thunder Craft Boats, 489 U.S. 141, 164–65 (1989). 
49. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230–31; Bonito, 489 U.S. at 167–68. 
50. Sears, 376 U.S. at 230. 
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protection of a wine decanter, which was also protected by a design patent.51  
Specifically, in Mogen, the TTAB refused the registration on the principal 
register.52  The TTAB reasoned that trade dress protection for the decanter 
would be inconsistent with the purpose and intent of patent law because it 
would interfere with the right of others to make fair use of the design when the 
design patent expired.53  The TTAB also reasoned that the use of the patented 
design did not constitute use as a trademark because the design was used 
exclusively only because the owner of the design patent had a monopoly on the 
use of the design.54  After the affirmation of the rejection from the TTAB, the 
applicant appealed the decision to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals 
(CCPA).55 
The CCPA reversed the TTAB, allowing the registration of the design of 
the wine decanter on the principal register.56  The court took a hyper-technical 
reading of the design patent and trade dress statutes, giving little consideration 
to the actual impact of its decision or Supreme Court precedent.  The court 
concluded that trademark rights on a design covered by a design patent do not 
extend the patent monopoly beyond the expiration of the patent.57  The court 
asserted that “[t]he termination of either has no legal effect on the continuance 
of the other” because the expiration of the patent merely ends the “patentee’s 
right to exclude held under the patent law.”58  The court also stated that it knows 
of no provision of patent law that guarantees a right to copy the subject matter 
of an expired patent.59 
This hyper-technical reading of the statutes ignores the purpose and intent 
of patent law, Supreme Court precedent, and the ways laws interact in practice.  
While it may be true that there is no statute that expressly creates the right to 
copy, as explained above, the right to copy is inherent in the Constitution and 
intent of patent law, and it is supported by substantial Supreme Court precedent 
that is completely ignored by the CCPA.  Moreover, many patent law doctrines 
are not expressly stated in statutes but are judicially created or interpreted from 
the language and purpose of the statutes (e.g. doctrine of equivalents;60 double-
 
51. In re Mogen David Wine, Corp., 134 U.S.P.Q. 576 (P.O. T.App.Bd. 1962) 
52. Id. at 578.  
53. Id. 
54. Id. 
55. In re Mogen David Wine Corp., 328 F.2d 925 (C.C.P.A. 1964). 
56. Id. at 932. 
57. Id. at 930.  
58. Id. (emphasis added). 
59. Id. 
60. See, e.g., Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., Inc. v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 608 
(1950). 
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patenting61).  Therefore, it is not sufficient for the CCPA to simply say that they 
know of no law about the right to copy.  Furthermore, the fact that patent law 
and trademark law have no statutorily defined legal effects on each other does 
not mean that the application of the two has no legal consequences for each 
other.  In fact, courts have long held that patent law and trademark law interact, 
and one can implicate the ability to get another or the scope of another.62 
About ten years after Mogen, the CCPA again heard a case about the right 
to copy and basically ignored the Supreme Court precedent on it.  In In re 
Honeywell, the CCPA followed its previous decision in Mogen, while 
attempting to distinguish it from the Supreme Court precedent on the right to 
copy.63  However, the CCPA conflates the functionality doctrine with the right 
to copy doctrine.  Because of this, the CCPA ends up ignoring the right to copy 
doctrine because the design patents do not evince that a product configuration 
is functional and therefore not protectable with trade dress.  The CCPA seems 
to be arguing, in essence, that because design patents do not evince 
functionality, the subject matter does not pass to the public upon expiration like 
the subject matter of a utility patent. 
The first argument that the CCPA makes in Honeywell is that the Supreme 
Court’s precedent was concerned with trade dress protection for expired utility 
patents, whereas Mogen was concerned with trade dress protection for expired 
design patents and so was the case at hand.  The CCPA seems to think that it 
was the functionality of the utility patents that caused the Supreme Court to 
create the right to copy doctrine.  However, this reading of the Supreme Court’s 
precedent in Singer and Kellogg is severely misguided.  The Supreme Court 
made it abundantly clear in Singer that upon “the expiration of a patent the 
monopoly created by it ceases to exist, and the right to make the thing formerly 
covered by the patent becomes public property.”64  The discussion of the right 
to copy doctrine in Singer does not even mention the functional nature of the 
expired patent.  The dedication to the public is clear, unqualified, and 
completely irrespective of functionality.  The doctrine as stated applies with 
equal force to design patents. 
Furthermore, while the court in Honeywell is correct that the Supreme Court 
in Kellogg considered more than the design patent when ruling that there is a 
 
61. See, e.g., In re Thorington, 418 F.2d 528, 536 (C.C.P.A. 1969). 
62. Daniel v. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 231 F. 827, 833 (3d Cir. 1916) (ruling that a utility 
patent is evidence of a trademark’s structural value); Best Lock Corp. v. Schlage Lock Co., 413 F.2d 
1195, 1199–1200 (C.C.P.A. 1969) (holding that a utility patent uncontrovertibly established that a 
trademark is primarily functional); In re Morton-Norwich Prods., Inc., 671 F.2d 1332, 1340–41 
(C.C.P.A. 1982). 
63. In re Honeywell, Inc., 497 F.2d 1344, 1348 (C.C.P.A. 1974). 
64. Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896) (emphasis added). 
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right to copy,65 it was incorrect to assume that the lack of the other factors 
destroyed the right to copy.  Again, the Supreme Court’s language in Kellogg 
is clear.  In fact, Kellogg quotes the language of Singer.66  The court in 
Honeywell seems to imply that the most important factor was the fact that the 
patented machines could produce only the shredded wheat design also 
protected by the expired design patents.67  However, there is no reason to 
believe that this factor is any more dispositive than the expired design patent 
factor; especially given that a theoretical machine that made shredded wheat 
with a shape different from the one covered by the design patent would likely 
infringe under the doctrine of equivalents.68  There is nothing in the Supreme 
Court’s decision to give the impression that it “relied heavily upon” this factor, 
as the court in Honeywell stated.69 
The CCPA’s attempt to differentiate between expired design and utility 
patents is illogical.  As explained above, the CCPA in Mogen seems to have 
thought that the expired utility patent created the right to copy that prevented 
trade dress protection because of functionality.  However, the subject matter of 
design patents is substantially closer to that of trade dress than the subject 
matter of utility patents is.70  Therefore, if anything, an expired design patent 
should prevent trade dress protection more than an expired utility patent 
because the trade dress protection is more likely to extend a monopoly on the 
same subject matter. 
The CCPA also asserted that the right of consumers to not be confused is 
more important than the right of the public to copy expired design patents.71  
However, this again ignores Supreme Court precedent.  Had the Supreme Court 
believed this was true, the Supreme Court would have not held as they did in 
Singer and Kellogg.  As explained above, in both Singer and Kellogg, the 
Supreme Court held that the right to copy prevented the product from being 
registered under trade dress law.72  If the Supreme Court agreed with the 
rationale in Honeywell, the Supreme Court would have held in Singer and 
Kellogg that the right to not be confused trumped the right to copy.  Clearly, 
this is not the case. 
 
65. See Honeywell, 497 F.2d. at 1348–49; Kellogg Co. v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 
119–20 (1938). 
66. Kellogg, 305 U.S. at 120. 
67. Honeywell, 497 F.2d at 1349. 
68. See generally Graver Tank & Mfg. Co., v. Linde Air Products Co., 339 U.S. 605, 607 
(1950).  
69. Honeywell, 497 F.2d at 1349. 
70. MPEP § 1512.11 (8th ed., Aug. 2011). 
71. Honeywell, 497 F.2d at 1348. 
72. See generally Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co., 163 U.S. 169, 185 (1896); Kellogg Co. v. 
National Biscuit Co., 305 U.S. 111, 112 (1938). 
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Finally, the flaws with the Honeywell decision are exacerbated by the fact 
that it was the CCPA that was ignoring, narrowing, and redefining Supreme 
Court precedent.  The CCPA was in no position to ignore and question the 
Supreme Court like it did.  Supreme Court precedent was binding on the CCPA, 
and the CCPA was obligated to apply Supreme Court precedent.73  The CCPA 
should have given more deference to the clear and unambiguous language of 
the Supreme Court decisions. 
C.  The Return of the Right to Copy? 
The Tenth Circuit attempted to revitalize the right to copy doctrine by 
conducting possibly the most thorough analysis of relevant legal principles.74  
In Vornado, the Tenth Circuit was resolving whether a product configuration is 
entitled to trade dress protection when it was a significant inventive component 
of a utility patent.75  In doing so, the Tenth Circuit: (1) analyzed Supreme Court 
precedent, including Singer and Kellogg, instead of ignoring it like the CCPA; 
(2) discussed the inability of the functionality doctrine to resolve this issue; and 
(3) weighed the competing purposes of patent and trademark law. 
The Tenth Circuit’s analysis of the Supreme Court precedent was similar 
to the discussion above.  The conclusion was that the language of the Supreme 
Court precedent is clear and unambiguous.  The expiration of a patent, utility 
or design, dedicates the invention to the public and creates a public right to copy 
that invention.76  The right to copy does not depend on the functionality doctrine 
or whether the interfering statute was state or federal.77  The right to copy exists 
upon the expiration of a patent, and the consumer’s right to not be confused, 
whether from state or federal unfair competition laws, does not trump the right 
to copy.78 
The functionality doctrine is inadequate because the availability of 
alternatives.79  The availability of functionally equivalent alternatives to a 
product configuration that is the subject of an expired utility patent will remove 
the presumption of functionality with respect to the product configuration’s 
ability to receive trade dress protection.80  However, as demonstrated by 
Vornado, it is possible for a product configuration to “simultaneously be 
 
73. Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 527 (1966); Flavor Corp. of Am. v. Kemin Indust., Inc., 
493 F.2d 275, 280 (8th Cir. 1974) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1256 (1948)). 
74. See Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498 (10th Cir. 1995). 
75. Id. at 1499. 
76. Id. at 1504–05. 
77. Id. at 1506. 
78. Id. at 1504–05. 
79. Id. at 1506–07. 
80. Id. at 1507. 
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patentably useful, novel, and nonobvious and also nonfunctional, in trade dress 
parlance.”81  Therefore, products covered by expired utility patents that have 
functionally equivalent alternatives can potentially be protected by trade dress 
protection after the expiration of the utility patent.  This overlap is amplified 
when the expired patent is a design patent.  An expired design patent creates a 
presumption that the design is primarily ornamental (i.e. valid) and not 
functional.82  Therefore, products covered by expired design patents are more 
likely to qualify for indefinite trade dress protection. 
Concluding that the functionality doctrine does not eliminate the overlap 
between patent and trademark law, the Tenth Circuit in Vornado discussed the 
competing goals of the bodies of law.83  The three main purposes of patent law 
are (1) to foster and reward invention, (2) to promote the disclosure of 
inventions to stimulate further innovation, and (3) to add inventions to the 
public domain to be freely used after the expiration of patents.84  The court 
noted here that the purposes of patent law are in stark contrast to the purposes 
served by the functionality doctrine; specifically, the functionality doctrine 
serves the purpose of ensuring that there are sufficient product configurations 
in the public domain to foster competition, and patent law is not concerned with 
competition.85  Rather, “patents operate by temporarily reducing 
competition . . . to give the public the benefits of technological progress.”86  The 
court also points out that trade dress protection directly interferes with the right 
to use inventions previously covered by now-expired utility patents.87 
The core purpose of trademark law, and trade dress protection for product 
configurations, is to avoid consumer confusion as to the source of products.88  
However, the Tenth Circuit notes that it cannot be assumed that Congress 
“intended to be as expansive in its protection of product configurations as in its 
protection of traditional word or picture trademarks.”89  The broad 
interpretation of product configuration trade dress protection under Section 
43(a) of the Lanham Act is judicially created.90  The court also notes that 
confusion based on product configuration is caused, in part, by the fact that 
 
81. Id. at 1506. 
82. 35 U.S.C. § 171 (2006); Rosco, Inc. v. Mirror Lite Co., 304 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 
2002). 
83. Vornado, 58 F.3d at 1507. 
84. Id. 
85. Id.  
86. Id. at 1507–08. 
87. Id. at 1508. 
88. Id. 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 1508–09. 
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consumers can rely on the product configuration as a source identifier, which 
is a result of trade dress protection in product configuration.91  Consequently, 
if the source of a product could not have exclusive use of a product 
configuration, competitors would use the same or similar product 
configurations and consumers would learn to not rely on the product 
configuration as a source identifier.92  After its discussion of the purpose of 
product configuration trade dress law, the Tenth Circuit concludes “that 
protecting against that degree of consumer confusion that may arise from the 
copying of configurations that are significant parts of patented inventions is, at 
best, a peripheral concern of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act.”93 
Thus, the court held that 
where a disputed product configuration is part of a claim in a utility 
patent, and the configuration is a described, significant inventive aspect 
of the invention, . . . so that without it the invention could not fairly be 
said to be the same invention, patent law prevents its protection as trade 
dress, even if the configuration is nonfunctional.94 
In reaching this holding, the court discusses the competing interests of 
competitors using the product configuration.  Specifically, the court notes that 
if it is true that a competitor does not need to use a product configuration to 
compete effectively in the market, it is even more true that the original user of 
the product configuration does not need to use the product configuration to 
identify its products.95  The court stated that “[i]t would defy logic to assume 
that there are not almost always many more ways to identify a product than 
there are ways to make it.”96 
While the Tenth Circuit does not specifically address design patents in 
Vornado, it stated that it need not “take a position on whether utility patents 
should be viewed differently than design patents[.]”97  It makes sense to treat 
design patents and utility patents nearly identically, if not identically, because 
both stem from the same constitutional authority.  In fact, it makes more sense 
to prevent the protection under trade dress of a configuration that was the 
subject of a design patent because, as explained above, design patent and trade 
dress protection on the same product are more likely to cover the same features. 
 
91. Id. at 1509. 
92. Id. 
93. Id. 
94. Id. at 1510 (internal citation omitted). 
95. Id. at 1509–10. 
96. Id. at 1510. 
97. Id. at 1503 n.11. 
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The same policy that the Tenth Circuit upheld in Vornado, and that was part 
of the Supreme Court jurisprudence from Singer until Mogen, should be 
readopted regarding patents generally, and design patents specifically.  It 
should be self-evident that the constitutional declaration that patent law should 
promote the progress of science and the useful arts should trump the right of 
consumers to be protected from the potential confusion caused by competitors 
using similar trade dress; this is especially so given that, as explained in 
Vornado, confusion can be avoided by other forms of trademark protection such 
as branding and labeling.  While many courts and others argue that trade dress 
does not extend a design patent monopoly because the two areas of law serve 
different purposes,98 this argument is naïve; the fact that the laws are intended 
to serve a different purpose does not preclude the ability of the laws to overlap, 
and it does not preclude the ability of one body of law to interfere with the 
purpose of the other body of law.  As explained above, even though trade dress 
and design patent laws serve different purposes, the two bodies of law have 
significant overlap.  The fact that products can potentially receive both design 
patent and trade dress protection should be sufficient to rebut such a fleeting 
dismissal of the issue.  It is not enough to simply assert that the two areas of 
law serve different purposes and not examine the consequences that the areas 
of law have for each other. 
As explained above, the right to copy is a constitutionally created doctrine 
within patent law that the courts have been ignoring for over forty years.  In 
function, design patents are not limited in time and do not promote the progress 
of the useful arts because it is possible to protect the design of a product 
indefinitely through design patent protection and subsequent trade dress 
protection.  The next section of this Comment will discuss how the TrafFix 
decision, in an attempt to prevent the extension of utility patent protection 
through trade dress protection, actually re-entrenched the extension of design 
patent protection though trade dress protection. 
III.  TRAFFIX DID NOT DO ENOUGH TO SAVE RIGHT TO COPY, BUT THERE IS 
HOPE 
The Supreme Court in TrafFix had the opportunity to revisit and potentially 
reassert the right to copy doctrine in patent law.  In front of the Court was a 
claim for trade dress infringement based on a copied dual-spring design that 
was the subject of an expired utility patent.99  The Court explicitly avoided the 
 
98. See, e.g., Hubbell Inc. v. Pass & Seymour, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 955, 958–961 (S.D.N.Y. 
1995); Krueger Int’l, Inc. v. Nightingale Inc., 915 F. Supp. 595, 604–05 (S.D.N.Y. 1996); Topps Co., 
Inc. v. Gerrit J. Verburg Co., 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18556 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
99. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 25–26 (2001). 
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right to copy issue when it declared that it need not resolve the question of 
whether the Patent Clause of the Constitution, of its own force, prohibits the 
holder of an expired utility patent from claiming trade dress protection.100  
However, the Court specifically notes that the time to consider the matter will 
be a case “in which trade dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired 
utility patent[.]”101  The Court did not address whether a case in which trade 
dress becomes the practical equivalent of an expired design patent would be a 
time to consider the matter. 
Instead of considering the right to copy, the Court made its determination 
based on functionality.  Specifically, the Court held that an expired utility patent 
covering the design claimed to be covered by trade dress adds great weight to 
the statutory presumption that the design is functional and not protectable by 
trade dress.102  The Court performed a thorough analysis of the convoluted trade 
dress functionality doctrine and concluded that TrafFix failed to carry its 
burden of demonstrating that the trade dress design was non-functional.103 
Panduit wrote a Brief Amicus Curia in TrafFix urging the Court to reaffirm 
and follow its holding in Singer “and enunciate a bright-line rule that bars trade 
dress protection for ‘the thing formerly covered by the patent’ because, upon 
expiration of the patent, the right to make that thing ‘becomes public 
property.’”104  Panduit was, at the time it authored the Brief Amicus Curia, a 
defendant in a similarly situated case.105  Panduit was accused of infringing a 
product configuration trade dress covering the subject of an expired utility 
patent.106  Panduit argued that the right to copy is founded in the Constitution, 
affirmed in Singer, and acts as an absolute bar to trade dress protection for 
products covered by expired utility patents.107  Panduit also discusses the 
relevant case law that is discussed above.108  The Court declined to rule on the 
issue presented by Panduit’s Brief, but the Court did explicitly address it.109 
While the Court in TrafFix did not particularly hinder the right to copy 
doctrine with regards to utility patent protection, it caused more problems for 
the right to copy doctrine with regards to design patent protection.  Courts since 
 
100. Id. at 35. 
101. Id.  
102. Id. at 29–30. 
103. Id. at 32–35. 
104. Brief Amicus Curiae of Panduit Corp. in Support of Petitioner at 2; TrafFix Devices, Inc. 
v. Marketing Displays, 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (No. 99-1571), 1999 U.S. Briefs 1571, at 2. 
105. Thomas & Betts Corp. v. Panduit Corp., 138 F.3d 277 (7th Cir. 1998). 
106. Id. at 282. 
107. Brief Amicus Curia of Panduit, supra note 104, at 3–10. 
108. Id. 
109. TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 35 (2001). 
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TrafFix have applied the discussion regarding the presumption of functionality 
from expired utility patents to create a presumption of non-functionality from 
expired design patents.110  Even the United States addressed the consequences 
for design patents in its Brief Amicus Curia.111  The United States specifically 
notes that “functionality analysis might not fully reconcile the scope of trade 
dress protection with patent-law right-to-copy principles . . . because the subject 
matter of design patents is, by definition, ornamental and non-functional.”112  
Because the subject of design patents is ornamental and non-functional, like 
product configuration trade dress, the functionality doctrine will not prevent the 
unwarranted extension of design patent protection through trade dress 
protection.  Therefore, the discussion of the presumption of functionality 
because of an expired utility patent caused courts to interpret it as a presumption 
of non-functionality for expired design patents. 
While the Court refused to address the issue in TrafFix with respect to 
utility patents and failed to address the issue with respect to design patents, its 
statement that the right to copy doctrine will need to be addressed when the 
functionality doctrine is not sufficient gives hope that the Court could reaffirm 
its ruling from Singer.  Hopefully, the Court’s failure to state that it will need 
to address the matter in a case in which trade dress becomes the practical 
equivalent of an expired design patent was a simple omission and not an 
indication of the Court’s stance on the issue.  If it is a simple omission, it is 
likely that the Court will at least consider the issue if such a case arises, and 
hopefully it will reaffirm the right to copy from Singer.  Either way, it is clear 
that the Supreme Court’s reliance on the functionality doctrine will not be 
sufficient to prevent the unconstitutional extension of design patent protection 
through trade dress protection. 
IV.  TRADE DRESS UNCONSTITUTIONALLY EXTENDS DESIGN PATENTS 
The extension of design patent protection though trade dress protection 
unconstitutionally interferes with the right to copy guaranteed by the 
Constitution.  Furthermore, the right to copy should apply to designs that are 
unpatented but would otherwise qualify for design patent protection (ignoring 
the one-year statutory bar under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b)).  Otherwise, the language 
of the Patent Clause in the Constitution is without effect.  This is contrary to 
the purpose of the Constitution and violates canons of constitutional 
 
110. See, e.g., Fuji Kogyo Co., Ltd. v. Pac. Bay Int’l, Inc., 461 F.3d 675, 683–684 (6th Cir. 
2006); Secalt S.A. v. Wuxi Shenxi Constr. Mach. Co., Ltd., 668 F.3d 677, 685 (9th Cir. 2012); In re 
Becton, Dickinson & Co., 675 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2012). 
111. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, TrafFix Devices, Inc. 
v. Marketing Displays Inc., 532 U.S. 23 (2001) (No. 99-1571), 1999 U.S. Briefs 1571 at 18–19. 
112. Id. at 19 n.6 (internal citation omitted). 
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construction. 
When a design patent expires, the new, original, and ornamental design 
previously covered by the design patent should be dedicated to the public.  
Trade dress protection on the subject matter of an expired design patent allows 
the owner of a design patent to protect the design indefinitely.  This prevents 
the use of the subject of the expired design patent in any way that could 
conceivably be construed as infringing the trade dress.  While it may not 
prevent all use of the design because the design could be used in a way that was 
not confusing and therefore not violative of trade dress protection, as explained 
above, the right to copy should be the right to copy the invention in all respects, 
not just in the respects that could not be construed as being confusing.  
Furthermore, the chilling effect that the trade dress protection would have and 
the ability of the owner to bully accused infringers expands the functional scope 
of the trade dress protection beyond products that actually infringe;113 holders 
of the trade dress could assert in a Cease and Desist Letter or even a Complaint 
that a certain product infringes their trade dress, even when it is clear that it 
does not, to bully the accused infringer into ceasing. 
The right to use a design should also apply to designs that are unpatented 
but otherwise patentable under 35 U.S.C. § 171 as a design patent.  While the 
rule in Sears was based on the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution,114 the 
logic still applies.  In Sears, the Supreme Court held that a state may not protect 
a patentable but unpatented product though an alternative form of monopoly 
protection.115  The Court reasoned that “the patent system is one in which 
uniform federal standards are carefully used to promote invention while at the 
same time preserving free competition.”116  The Court held that a state cannot 
extend the life of a patent, give a patent on an article which did not qualify for 
federal patent protection, or give protection of a kind that clashes with the 
objectives of the federal patent laws.117  While the Supremacy Clause cannot 
be used to invalidate federal laws,118 the Constitution binds federal courts and 
Congress.119  Therefore, the creation of trade dress law through legislation and 
common law must comport with the Constitution, including the Patent Clause.  
While the trade dress law is derived from traditional trademark law and 
 
113. Joe Wilcox, Apple is a Patent Bully, BETANEWS (Aug. 4, 2011), http://betanews.com/
2011/08/04/apple-is-a-patent-bully/. 
114. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Stiffel Co., 376 U.S. 225, 230–31 (1964). 
115. Id. at 231. 
116. Id. at 230–31. 
117. Id. at 231. 
118. See U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2. 
119. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238, 291 (1936); Cook v. Moffat & Curtis 
46 U.S. 295, 308 (1847); Dixon v. State, 224 Ind. 327, 341 (1946). 
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trademark law is derived from the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, trade 
dress law is substantially more attenuated from the explicit purpose of the 
Constitution than the right to copy expired patents.  Clear and direct language 
supports the right to copy expired patents, but trade dress protection is based 
on an expansion of trademark law which is based on an expansion of 
Congress’s power to regulate commerce among the several states.120  Therefore, 
the right to copy should trump trade dress protection, especially given that the 
confusion that is arguably avoided by trade dress protection can be avoided by 
traditional trademark protection.121 
If the public does not have the right to copy expired patents, including 
design patents, specific phrases from the Constitution would be left without 
effect.  Specifically, the phrases “[t]o promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts” and “for limited Times” would functionally be without effect.  
With respect to design patents, allowing trade dress protection for expired 
design patents would give “for limited Times” no effect because, once the 
limited design patent monopoly expired, it would functionally be indefinitely 
extended by trade dress protection.  As explained above, trade dress can cover 
nearly identical, if not identical, subject matter as design patents, and the same 
products are often covered by both.  Therefore, the subject matter of a design 
patent can be protected forever after the design patent expires.  Furthermore, 
allowing trade dress protection for expired design patents would give “[t]o 
promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts” no effect because, as 
explained above, this language is meant to allow free use of inventions once the 
limited monopoly of the patent expires.  The purpose is provide the public with 
the ability to take inventions in the public domain to improve them and develop 
new inventions.  The ability to protect inventions in the public domain with 
trade dress prevents the public from using and improving upon the public 
domain. 
Interpreting the Constitution to give no effect to words is in direct 
contradiction with canons of constitutional interpretation.122  The Supreme 
Court in Marbury v. Madison declared that “[i]t cannot be presumed that any 
clause in the constitution is intended to be without effect; and therefore such a 
construction is inadmissible, unless the words require it.”123  Therefore, trade 
dress protection cannot be interpreted in a way that gives no effect to the 
language of the Constitution. 
 
120. See U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 3; 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2006). 
121. Vornado Air Circulation Sys., Inc. v. Duracraft Corp., 58 F.3d 1498, 1509–10 (10th Cir. 
1995). 
122. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803); Noel Canning v. Nat’l Labor Relations Bd., 
705 F.3d 490, 507 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
123. Marbury, 5 U.S. at 174.  
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CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has all but ignored the right to copy for the past forty 
or so years.  The Constitution and early Supreme Court jurisprudence 
articulated the right to copy as an absolute right of the public to use, in all 
respects, the subject matter of expired patents, both design and utility.  This 
right to copy barred the use of trade dress protection to extend expired patents.  
Since, courts have ignored this precedent and adopted a new jurisprudence that 
patent and trademark law serve different purposes, but the courts do not go 
beyond this bare assertion.  The courts have failed to actually discuss the 
interaction of the two bodies of law to explain how the apparently different 
purposes mean the two do not interfere with each other in any way.  This is 
likely because such an analysis would be impossible since it is clear that the 
two bodies of law do interfere with each other.  In fact, design patent litigation 
often includes claims for trade dress infringement as well.  This fact alone is 
reason to require courts to do more of an analysis than just assert that the laws 
serve different purposes.  The Supreme Court should grant a writ of certiorari 
to a case that involves trade dress protection of an expired design patent, or 
rehear a case that involves the same, and it should reaffirm the bright-line rule 
from Singer.  Only then will the Constitutional command that patent law 
promotes the progress of science and the useful arts through monopolies limited 
in time be realized, at least in this respect. 
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